Earnings Performance Measures and CEO Turnover: Street versus GAAP Earnings by Jarva, H et al.
Earnings Performance Measures and CEO Turnover: Street versus GAAP
Earnings
Henry JARVA*
Aalto University, Finland
Henry.Jarva@aalto.fi
Juha-Pekka KALLUNKI
University of Oulu, Finland
Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden
Aalto University, Finland
Juha-Pekka.Kallunki@oulu.fi
Gilad LIVNE
University of Exeter, United Kingdom
G.Livne@exeter.ac.uk
February 6, 2019
* Corresponding author contact information: Tel.: +358 40 701 5840; e-mail: henry.jarva@aalto.fi.
We thank the workshop participants at Aalto University, Cass Business School, Hebrew University,
LMU, the University of Exeter, the University of Leicester, University of Haifa, WHU, the 2014
Nordic Accounting Conference, the 2014 EAA Annual Meeting, and especially Eli Amir, Mark
Bradshaw, Martin Jacob, Matti Keloharju, Sonia Konstandinidi, Per Olsson, Markku Rahiala,
Sarayut Rueangsuwan, and anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. We
thank Bianca Beyer, Topi Kämäräinen, and Ashish Khatri for research assistance. All remaining
errors are ours.
Earnings Performance Measures and CEO Turnover: Street versus GAAP
Earnings
Abstract
Prior research reports that analysts focus on street earnings, which are measures that typically
exceed GAAP earnings. Using a sample of CEO turnovers from 1993–2016 we show that the
likelihood and speed of forced CEO turnover - but not voluntary turnover - are higher when
analysts exclude income-decreasing items. The association between exclusions and forced
turnovers is particularly pronounced for high magnitude exclusions. We also show that greater
street exclusion of income-decreasing items, the lower CEO bonus payouts. We find that
boards use audited and more conservative GAAP earnings in evaluating and dismissing CEOs,
except in the recent period of 2010-2016.
Keywords: Street earnings, Street exclusions, GAAP earnings, CEO turnover
JEL classification: G38, J41, K22, M41
11. Introduction
The statutory purpose of financial statements is to provide decision-useful information to
investors, lenders and creditors (FASB, 2010). Kothari et al. (2010) provide a more nuanced view
by arguing that the principal role of the income statement is to measure firm performance for
contracting, particularly with management, whereas the balance sheet primarily serves a
stewardship role. Although firms are required to prepare income statement numbers using
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), many analyst focus on a different
performance measure colloquially known as ‘street’ earnings. These are analyst-adjusted measures
of GAAP earnings that are also regularly tracked in commercial databases. Street earnings
typically do not include certain non-recurring expense items that reduce reported profit (henceforth,
street exclusions). Analysts and investors largely rely on street earnings rather than GAAP
earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Kolev et al. 2008; Ford 2016).
A number of papers examine the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance
(e.g., Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Engel et al., 2003; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Jenter and
Kanaan, 2015; Ghosh and Wang, 2018). Although this literature finds consistently that CEO
turnover is inversely related to firm performance, the relation is not strong (Brickley, 2003). A
second strand of literature considers the persistence and relevance of non-recurring items that
analysts often exclude from reported earnings for stock pricing (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002;
Burgstahler et al., 2002; Doyle et al., 2003; Marques, 2006; Dechow et al., 2014).1 Bushman et al.
1 For example, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find that street earnings are more persistent (and hence more informative for
valuation purposes) than GAAP earnings. Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) and Dechow et al. (2014) show that street
earnings are more closely associated with stock prices than with GAAP earnings.
2(2006) and Banker et al. (2009) provide theoretical arguments supported by empirical evidence
from compensation data that the greater the value relevance2 of a performance measure, the greater
its pay-performance sensitivity. The results reported in Bushman et al. (2006) and Banker et al.
(2009) therefore suggest little role in CEO performance evaluation for street exclusions because
analysts disregard them.3 Black et al. (2018) find that a small fraction of firms that use non-GAAP
performance measures internally in compensation contracting also disclose these measures  in
earnings announcements. This finding suggests firms may be using different performance
measures in internal communications vs. external communication. Consistent with this empirical
insight, several papers have argued that measures used in stock market valuations could (and
should) differ from measures used in internal decisions (Gjesdal 1981; Paul 1992; Bushman and
Smith 2001; Wagenhofer 2009; Kothari et al. 2010). This suggests that even though street
exclusions are not value relevant, they may still be used internally. In other words, one set of papers
suggests that because street exclusions are valuation irrelevant, they should also be discounted by
boards when deciding on CEO dismissals. On the other hand, other papers distinguish between
value relevance and relevance for internal decision making. The implication is that street
exclusions can (and should) be used internally, if they provide information about the quality of the
CEO.
In this paper, we examine which set of the arguments discussed above is supported in the
context of CEO retention decisions, because little is known whether numbers that are used by
market participants, or GAAP numbers, are more relevant for internal corporate governance
2 Value relevance refers to the information content of a variable that is relevant for the pricing of the stock.
3 Neither paper, however, examines the role of analyst-produced performance measures.
3purposes, especially CEO retention decisions. Specifically, we contribute to this literature by
examining whether the likelihood of a CEO dismissal is related to the exclusions that are largely
ignored by analysts and investors for valuation purposes.
Our empirical results are derived from the intersection of ExecuComp, Compustat, CRSP,
and I/B/E/S databases for the period from 1993 to 2016. Using a comprehensive sample of 2,635
CEO turnover events of which 716 are classified as forced turnover, our logistic regressions and
proportional hazard analyses indicate that the likelihood and speed of forced CEO turnover – but
not voluntary turnover - are positively related to street exclusions and, more generally, to GAAP
earnings. The positive relation between street exclusions is stronger the larger the magnitude of
analysts’ exclusion of income-decreasing items. We obtain these results after controlling for a
variety of factors, including a firm’s pre-turnover performance, firm-specific characteristics, and
governance variables. Therefore, the results suggest that the earnings measure used in CEO
retention decisions (GAAP earnings) differs from the performance measure used by external
parties for valuation purposes (street earnings).
We conduct several additional analyses to better understand this finding. First, although
street exclusions are a measure based on analyst data provider information (such as I/B/E/S), they
are possibly influenced by managers who routinely communicate with analysts. Managers can
voluntarily disclose a closely related earnings measure, which is commonly known as non-GAAP
earnings.4 Like street earnings, non-GAAP earnings tend to exclude income-decreasing items, but
4 It is important to note that we are not examining whether CEOs’ voluntary disclosures of non-GAAP earnings affects
boards’ retention decisions. We leave this issue for future research for two reasons. First, a large dataset of manager-
disclosed non-GAAP earnings have not been widely available. Second, we want to examine how an EPS metric
produced by professionals (namely, I/B/E/S), and used by investors, is associated with forced CEO turnover decisions.
4managers decide what is excluded. This voluntary disclosure has risen in recent years although it
was much less common in the earlier years of our sample. Nevertheless, it stands to reason that
communications from managers, either privately (in earlier years) or publicly (more recently),
shape street earnings and analyst forecasts. One concern regarding such communications is that
they are used opportunistically. In response to this concern, in March 2003, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced Regulation G, which restricts what managers can
exclude from GAAP earnings; it establishes that only non-recurring items can be excluded.5 The
SEC has further increased its attention to non-GAAP in 2010 when it issued a new set of
Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations (C&DIs) (Black et al., 2018). If the SEC interventions
caused analysts to focus on non-recurring items when calculating street earnings, street exclusions
may have become less value relevant after the introduction of Regulation G. We thus explore
whether the relation between the magnitude of street exclusions and CEO turnover is driven by
the pre-Regulation G period. We find evidence of a significant relation between forced CEO
turnover and street exclusions also post-Regulation G period but not in the C&DI period. This may
be related to Lev’s (2018) argument that the usefulness of reported earnings has rapidly
deteriorated particularly during the recent 2–3 decades. While it is premature to make any definite
claim, the pattern we document is alarming because the primary role of earnings is to reflect
performance.
To further shed light on the role of street exclusions in the broader context of CEO
performance evaluation, we run a third set of analyses applied to CEO bonus payouts. Gaver and
5  Kolev et al. (2008) and Heflin and Hsu (2008) provide evidence that manager-disclosed exclusions are more
transitory, infrequent, and smaller in magnitude following the introduction of Regulation G.
5Gaver (1998) provide evidence that CEO cash compensation is shielded from the effects of above
the line losses. In contrast, we find that street exclusions are significantly associated with CEO
bonus, a finding that holds in both pre- and post-Regulation G periods, but not in the C&DI period.
Taken together, our results suggest that boards use GAAP earnings in evaluating and disciplining
CEOs and do not ignore the less valuation-relevant street exclusions with the exception of the most
recent period.
One important contribution of this study is to show that when balancing between the
potentially more value-relevant street earnings and the (typically) more conservative GAAP
earnings, boards tend to rely on the latter. One possible explanation is that street exclusions,
particularly large ones, are seen as a signal about future managerial performance because they
contain information about past investment underperformance. Consistent with this
“underperformance hypothesis”, we provide evidence that street exclusions are primarily
attributable to special items (that contain various types of asset write-offs). This result can also
explain why CEOs avoid timely write-offs (Bartov et al., 1998; Alciatore et al., 2000; Hirschey
and Richardson, 2002, Jarva 2009; Li and Sloan 2017). CEOs seem to face a trade-off between
applying GAAP in a timely and unbiased manner to avoid costly scrutiny (Hazarika et al., 2012),
and protecting their CEO position by delaying recognition of losses. Moreover, while guiding
analysts to exclude reported losses can attract more internal scrutiny and thus increase the chance
of a dismissal, this practice helps keep stock prices high, which is beneficial for managers’ stock
of their company’s equity instruments. Managers therefore balance the dismissal risk against the
wealth benefit of guiding street exclusions. There are two additional, but not mutually exclusive,
explanations to our results. First, it is possible that boards, like analysts, understand that street
6exclusions in themselves are relatively unimportant. Still, we would expect to statistically establish
a significant relation between dismissals and street exclusions, if exclusions are correlated with
adverse private information that boards observe, but analysts (and researchers) do not. Second,
using more conservative and reliable numbers—rather than the higher street earnings—likely helps
boards gain legitimacy when making difficult retention decisions and deflect criticisms of their
action.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related research
and develops the hypotheses. The research design is presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes
the data and descriptive statistics. Section 5 provides the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1. Determinants of CEO turnover
There is an extensive literature on the determinants of CEO turnover, which for brevity we
succinctly summarize here. This literature documents the retention roles of accounting and stock
return performance (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Jenter and Kanaan,
2015; Ghosh and Wang 2018), industry-related factors such as homogeneity and competition
(Parrino, 1997; DeFond and Park, 1999), internal and external monitoring mechanisms (e.g., Goyal
and Park, 2002; Huson et al., 2001; Parrino et al., 2003; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008), firm-CEO
matching (Eisfeldt and Khunen, 2013) and accounting irregularities and earnings management
(Leone and Liu, 2010; Hazarika et al., 2012).
Both market-based and accounting-based performance measures are associated with CEO-
retention decisions. Engel et al. (2003) show that boards weigh accounting variables relatively
7more if they are measured more accurately. They also show that accounting variables become more
retention relevant as stock prices become more variable and hence noisier for performance
valuation purpose. This evidence extends similar findings from the compensation literature.
Agency theory establishes that multiple performance indicators should be used in optimal
contracting, as long as they are not perfectly correlated and in inverse relation to their precision
(Banker and Datar, 1989; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; and Baker et al., 1994). In addition to
performance measures that are observed externally, boards may rely on variables that are only
internally available (Hayes and Schaefer, 2000). Therefore, the externally observed performance
measures that we examine here (e.g., street exclusions) could appear retention relevant in our
analysis—not only because they are directly relevant to boards, but also because they are
incrementally informative over other internally-observed variables.
2.2. Street vs. GAAP earnings
The literature on street earnings establishes several relevant findings. Bradshaw and Sloan
(2002) report that the difference between GAAP earnings and street earnings has increased over
time. They also show that managers “encourage” analysts to focus on the (higher) street earnings.6
Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) provide evidence that this effort is successful in that markets seem to
respond to street earnings rather than GAAP earnings. This evidence is intriguing because
experimental evidence (Frederickson and Miller, 2004) suggests that professional investors are not
misled by street earnings that are higher than GAAP earnings. Instead, owing to cognitive bias,
6 In the same vein, Bowen et al. (2005) provide evidence that managers stress more favorable non-GAAP metrics in
press conferences.
8unsophisticated investors may over-value street earnings. Bhattacharya et al. (2007) provide
empirical evidence that further supports this conjecture.
Managers prepare and communicate non-GAAP earnings (also known as pro forma
earnings) with increased rates over time. Non-GAAP earnings are conceptually separate from
street earnings because the former originate from managers and the latter are produced by analysts.
Managers’ definitions of non-GAAP earnings need not be identical to analysts’ definition of street
earnings (Bhattacharya et al., 2003). Yet, Bradshaw (2003) notes that in 65% of the cases, pro
forma earnings and street earnings are identical and that the two measures are highly correlated.7
More recently, Doyle et al. (2013) review the process by which I/B/E/S, managers and analysts
communicate and reach a similar conclusion. Bentley et al. (2018) is the first to provide large-
sample evidence about the differences and similarities between managers’ non-GAAP reporting
and I/B/E/S’s street earnings. Their evidence shows that managers’ non-GAAP reporting agrees
with I/B/E/S’s street earnings 78.9 percent of the time. Taken together, this evidence suggests that
analysts’ formation of the measure of street earnings used in forecasts is shaped by managers’
communication of alternative earnings measures. However, while analysts have produced street
earnings for many years, pro-forma earnings appear in a much lower frequency and are not
available for researchers in commercial databases such as Compustat.
Black et al. (2018) examine the consistency with which non-GAAP earnings are used
internally, for compensation purposes, as well as externally to communicate with markets. They
7 Christensen et al. (2011) reach a similar conclusion: exclusions from street earnings vary from firm to firm, and they
are strongly influenced by what managers exclude from their pro forma earnings. Analysts’ incentives to co-operate
with managers may explain this finding (Lim, 2001).
9report that firms disclose non-GAAP earnings, either in the earnings announcement or proxy
statement in about 50% of their sample. Only in 11% of the cases non-GAAP earnings appear in
both statements. This suggests a small overlap between the use of non-GAAP in external
communication and internal compensation decisions. They do not explore how non-GAAP
earnings and exclusions from GAAP earnings influence CEO turnovers.8
It is important to recognize that communications between managers and analysts, either
publicly through the release of non-GAAP measures, or through private channels, may be
opportunistic because managers attempt to outperform these expectations. Several papers (e.g.,
Bartov et al., 2002; Isidro and Marques, 2013; Guillamon-Saorin et al., 2017) provide evidence
consistent with “expectations management.”
Our paper aims to explore whether the performance measures that parties external to the
firm (i.e., analysts) use for valuation purposes are used in internal retention decisions. We are
motivated by the tension between the arguments that suggest that a performance measure that is
more value relevant is also used more heavily in evaluating CEOs (Bushman et al., 2006, and
Banker et al. 2009) and the arguments that this need not be the case (Gjesdal 1981; Paul 1992;
Bushman and Smith 2001; Wagenhofer 2009; Kothari et al. 2010).9
2.3. Hypothesis development
There is practically no evidence as to which earnings metrics affect turnovers, and only a
handful of papers feature in the compensation literature upon which we can draw. Gaver and Gaver
8 Their sample spans the 2009-2015 period, and is therefore much smaller than ours.
9 Prior literature does not contrast earnings measures reported by firms and those used by analysts and in the context
of CEO turnover.
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(1998) show that nonrecurring gains flow through compensation but losses do not. This suggests
that managers are shielded from recognizing one-time losses. More recent evidence confirms this
finding but also suggests that boards exclude special items from compensation contracts for
financially distressed firms (Potepa, 2014). Banker et al. (2009) do not distinguish between
recurring and non-recurring income items; rather, they show that boards rely more heavily on
GAAP earnings than operating cash flows if earnings are also more value relevant. However, we
acknowledge that the evidence from the compensation literature may not carry over fully to
retention decisions for at least two reasons. First, firms’ compensation committees typically set
compensation contracts, while dismissal decisions are performed by boards whose responsibilities
are broader (e.g., strategic decisions, communication with shareholders, etc.). Second,
compensation contracts are explicitly written on observable numbers, but CEO retention is based
more on an implicit contract between the board and the CEO. Nevertheless, the basic idea that
boards should consult performance measures that are also used externally seems plausible in the
context of dismissal decisions.
From a legal perspective, a manager can be fired without cause, which is often the case
when boards lose trust in the former’s ability to run the firm.10 Therefore, the option to dismiss a
CEO without cause means that boards are free to rely on any performance measure (or a
combination of measures) that they consider relevant. Hence, unlike compensation contracts,
GAAP earnings do not carry any particular legal significance for a termination decision. From a
theoretical perspective, the choice of a performance measure is determined by its accuracy and
10 See, for example, The Wall Street Journal, “How to Fire a CEO,” 30 October 2006.
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correlation with unobservable managerial ability and effort (see, Engel et al., 2003). In making
retention decisions, the board therefore may be particularly interested in street earnings because
they are informative as to how sophisticated agents outside the firm view its performance.
However, boards may have a different view than investors about the accuracy and value
relevance of street earnings. First, such disagreement may arise because street earnings are not
audited while GAAP earnings are. Second, in dismissal decisions conservative boards likely prefer
conservative performance measures. To the extent that street earnings provide a rosier picture of
performance, when dismissing the incumbent CEO, boards may legitimize their decisions by
referring to a lower performance measure that appears reliable and objective. This, in turn, helps
boards defend against potential criticism (e.g., in the press, by analysts and possibly shareholders)
and appear unbiased. More broadly, whether GAAP earnings are more indicative of CEO ability
than street earnings in the eyes of boards remains an open question. Therefore, our null hypothesis
is as follows:
H1: Street exclusions are unrelated to the likelihood and speed of forced CEO turnover.
Our second hypothesis relates to regulatory interventions by the SEC. In 2003 and
following the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July 2002, the SEC put into force Regulation
G, which concerns the measurement and voluntary reporting of non-GAAP earnings. This
regulation requires firms that disclose non-GAAP earnings to provide a clear reconciliation of non-
GAAP to GAAP earnings and prohibits the exclusion of recurring income items from non-GAAP
earnings.
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In an early study, Marques (2006) documents that market reactions to items excluded from
GAAP earnings in non-GAAP earnings are similar before and after Regulation G, which suggests
that this regulation is ineffective.11 In a sample covering the post-regulation period, Doyle et al.
(2013) find evidence indicating that firm managers calculate non-GAAP earnings
opportunistically to meet or beat analysts’ expectations (which are based on street earnings). In a
closely related study, Heflin and Hsu (2008) find evidence suggesting that managers use non-
GAAP earnings to generate good performance perceptions to a lesser extent after the regulation is
enacted. Kolev et al. (2008) find that exclusions are more transitory following Regulation G.
Interestingly, in recent years (and under more stringent regulation) the voluntary disclosure of non-
GAAP earnings has increased significantly.12
Although street earnings and non-GAAP earnings are produced by different agents,
Regulation G and C&DI may have affected analyst-produced street earnings by focusing their
attention on non-recurring items. If post-regulatory intervention analysts exclude more non-
recurring items than before, boards may also disregard street exclusions to a greater extent
following stringent regulations. On the other hand, if boards use GAAP earnings to legitimize
dismissal decisions, the retention-relevance of GAAP earnings is expected to remain the same.
Therefore, whether the disclosure regulation changes have changed the retention relevance of
street exclusions in the eyes of boards is an empirical question. We present our second hypothesis
in null form:
11 Consistent with this assertion, the SEC has been concerned about compliance with Regulation G for some time and
has published several guidelines and clarifications since 2003, including the most recent set published in May 2016.
12 Some estimates indicate that the percentage of S&P 500 companies disclosing non-GAAP earnings increased from
72 percent in 2009 to 90 percent in 2016 (Ford, 2016).
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H2: Street exclusions are unrelated to the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers in different sub-
periods.
3. Research design
3.1. CEO turnover model
We use logistic regressions to examine the relation between the earnings-based
performance measures and the likelihood of CEO turnover. The dependent variable is the
probability of CEO turnover. Following Hazarika et al. (2012), we distinguish between forced and
voluntary turnover, but in the interest of brevity, we do not specify this in the notation. A turnover
event is identified if the CEO in one year is different from the CEO in the preceding year.
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Hazarika el al. 2012), we use year t-1 performance measures to
predict turnover in year t. This approach also overcomes the possibility a new CEO might take an
earnings bath affecting year t performance measures (Pourciau, 1993; Murphy and Zimmerman,
1993; Denis and Denis, 1995).
Our logistic model can be expressed as follows:
 ݈݊ ቈ
ܲ(ܻ = ܥܧܱ ݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௧|࢞)
ܲ(ܻ = ݊݋ ݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௧|࢞) ቉ = ࢞ᇱࢼ (1)
where ࢞ᇱ is a vector of explanatory variables and ࢼ is a vector of parameters. More specifically,
࢞ᇱࢼ = ߚଵܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁௧ିଵ + ߚଶܨ݋ݎ_ܴ݁ݒ௧ିଵ + ߚଷܴ݁ݐ_ܫ݀݅݋௧ିଵ+ߚସܴ݁ݐ_ܲ݁݁ݎ௧ିଵ + ߚହܵݐ݀_ܴ݁ݐ௧ିଵ + ߚ଺ܮ݋݃ܯܸܧ௧ିଵ + ߚ଻ܯܶܤ௧ିଵ+ߚ଼ܵܩܴ௧ିଵ + ߚଽܮ݁ݒ௧ିଵ + ߚଵ଴ܥܧܱ_ܣ݃݁௧ିଵ + ߚଵଵܥܧܱ_ܱݓ݊݁ݎ௧ିଵ+ߚଵଶܥܧܱ_ܦݑ݈ܽ௧ିଵ + ݕ݁ܽݎ ݂݂݁݁ܿݐݏ + ݅݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ ݂݂݁݁ܿݐݏ
(2)
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We use three variants of the earnings-based performance measure (Performance), which is
the main variable of interest: GAAP earnings per share (EPS_GAAP), street earnings per share as
provided by I/B/E/S (EPS_Street), and street exclusions—the difference between GAAP earnings
and street earnings (Exclusions)—all of which are scaled by the lagged stock price. The use of
I/B/E/S actual earnings as a proxy for street earnings is in line with previous research (e.g.,
Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Doyle et al., 2013; Kolev et al., 2008).
We control for several other firm-specific characteristics that have been shown to be related
to CEO turnover based on the previous literature (e.g., Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). First, because
exclusions affect analyst earnings forecasts, we control for revisions in analysts’ earnings estimates
(For_Rev), which refer to the last consensus forecast during the fiscal year minus the consensus
forecast three months after the end of the previous fiscal year scaled by the lagged stock price.13
We decompose stock returns into idiosyncratic and industry components (Ret_Idio and Ret_Peer,
respectively) because Jenter and Kanaan (2015) argue that boards of directors should ignore the
components of firm performance that are caused by factors beyond the CEO’s control. We expect
that lower idiosyncratic return increases the probability of turnover. We also include a measure of
firm risk (Std_Ret), computed as the standard deviation of the firm’s monthly stock returns over a
twelve-month period. Parrino et al. (2003) and Bushman et al. (2010) show that higher return
volatility increases the likelihood of CEO turnover. We control for firm size as measured by the
logarithm of the market value of equity (LogMVE). Following Hazarika et al. (2012), we control
13 It can also serve as a proxy for the board’s expectations (Farrell and Whidbee, 2003), or managerial guidance.
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for growth opportunities using the market-to-book ratio (MTB), for the current growth rate using
sales growth (SGR), and for the capital structure using debt leverage (LEV).
We control for three CEO characteristics. First, Brickley (2003) argues that the age of the
CEO is more important in explaining CEO turnover than measures of firm performance. Therefore,
we include the CEO’s age (CEO_Age) in our model. The next two variables, the CEO’s share
ownership (CEO_Owner) and a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO is also the board
chair (CEO_Dual) are our firm governance-related measures. Finally, we include year and industry
indicators (year effects and industry effects, respectively) to control for possible time and industry
effects, respectively. Full details on the definitions of these variables are provided in the Appendix.
3.2. Time-to-turnover model
As an alternative to Model 2, we examine the likelihood of CEO turnover using Cox
proportional hazard model estimation (see e.g., Hazarika et al., 2012). Unlike logistic regression,
the Cox proportional hazard model explicitly accounts for the right-censoring that is prevalent in
survival (or duration) time data. Specifically, sample censoring occurs because the follow-up
period ends at the end of 2016, before all cases of CEO turnover occur. A second more important
difference is that the dependent variable is the number of years that the CEO is in office. The Cox
proportional hazard model can be expressed as follows:
ℎ൫ݐห࢞(ݐ)൯ = ℎ஼ாை ௧௨௥௡௢௩௘௥(ݐ)exp [࢞ᇱࢼ] (3)
where h(t) is the hazard rate; x(t) is the same vector of time-varying covariates as in the logistic
model; and ࢼ is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The hazard function in (3) is the product
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of two functions. The function ℎ஼ாை ௧௨௥௡௢௩௘௥(ݐ) characterizes how the hazard function changes as
a function of survival time, while the other function, exp [࢞ᇱࢼ], characterizes how the hazard
function changes as a function of subject covariates (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1999). All
independent variables are the same as those in the logistic model, so we do not repeat them here.
3.3. Determinants of exclusions
In order to understand what may influence street exclusions, we use two approaches to
provide evidence regarding which income statement items analysts exclude from GAAP earnings.
First, following Doyle et al. (2003) and Kolev et al. (2008), we simply decompose exclusions into
special items and other exclusions. Second, we use the earnings decomposition framework of
Donelson et al. (2011) to develop a model that estimates normal and abnormal exclusions. The
dependent variable is Exclusions, and the explanatory variables are expense line items in the
income statement, including the cost of goods sold (COGS); sales, general and administrative
expenses (SGA); depreciation and amortization (Depr); tax expenses (Tax); special items (SI); and
all other expenses (Other). All the variables are deflated by the beginning-of-period market value
of equity. Equation (4) is estimated for each industry based on the Fama and French 48-industry
classification. Specifically, our measure of normal (abnormal) exclusions is the fitted (residual)
value from the following cross-sectional model:
ܧݔ݈ܿݑݏ݅݋݊ݏ௧ିଵ= ߙ଴ + ߙଵܥܱܩ ௧ܵିଵ + ߙଶܵܩܣ௧ିଵ + ߙଷܦ݁݌ݎ௧ିଵ + ߙସܶܽݔ௧ିଵ+ߙହܵܫ௧ିଵ + ߙ଺ܱݐℎ݁ݎ௧ିଵ + ߝ (4)
4. Sample and descriptive statistics
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Our data come from four sources: ExecuComp for CEO data, the Center for Research on
Securities Prices (CRSP) for stock returns data, Compustat for accounting data, and I/B/E/S for
analyst data. We first identify all cases of CEO turnover for the sample period from 1993 to 2016.14
In line with prior research (e.g., Engel et al. 2003; Eisfeldt and Kuhnen, 2013), we record a
turnover event if the CEO identifier (i.e., the executive who holds the annual CEO flag) in year t
is different from the CEO identifier in year t-1. The new CEO may prefer to report low earnings
in their first year to shield future income. Therefore, consistent with Hazarika et al. (2012), we
exclude the CEOs who serve only an interim period (i.e., less than a year) in office to minimize
any influence from earnings “big-bath” on our results. Following prior research, we eliminate
utilities (SIC 4400–4999) and financial (SIC 6000–6999) industries. We also eliminate firm-year
observations with insufficient data to compute the primary variables used in our tests.
Identifying whether a CEO’s departure is forced or voluntary requires an inspection of
press releases because forced turnover is often presented as retirement. Using a hand-collected
sample of press releases, we classify each CEO turnover event as forced or voluntary based on
information in the related news announcement. Specifically, following prior studies (Parrino 1997;
Huson et al., 2001; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Bushman et al. 2010; Hazarika et al. 2012), turnover
is classified as forced if (i) the CEO retires or resigns under questionable circumstances or the
company fires, demotes, or forces the CEO out of the position (e.g., due to policy differences); (ii)
the departing CEO is younger than 65 and the announcement does not report the reason as death,
14 We begin our sample period in 1993 because data on the ExecuComp variable CEOANN (which indicates whether
the executive served as CEO for all or most of the indicated fiscal year) are available from 1993.
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poor health, or the acceptance of another position;15 or (iii) the CEO retires but leaves the job
within six months of the retirement announcement and does not take a comparable position
elsewhere.
Our final sample contains 26,571 firm-year observations from 1993 to 2016. Of the total
sample of 2,635 CEO turnovers, 716 (27.2%) are forced. The sample size compares favorably with
that of the recent study of Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013). Table 1 reports the distribution of these
observations over the years. The results show that the number of observations varies over time and
that the average turnover rate is 10.0% for all firm-year observations implying an average CEO
tenure of 10 years. However, in the more recent period since 2010, total CEO turnover have
somewhat increased.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Table 2 and Figure 1 present the means and standard deviations of GAAP earnings per
share (EPS_GAAP), non-GAAP earnings per share (EPS_Street) and the exclusion of GAAP
earnings per share during the year (Exclusions) for each year in the sample period. The mean value
of EPS_GAAP is lower than the mean value of EPS_Street in all years except in 1994 and 1995.
EPS_GAAP is negative in 2002 (the dot.com crisis) and 2008 (the great financial crisis), but
EPS_Street is positive in all years. The standard deviations of EPS_GAAP, EPS_Street, and
Exclusions move in tandem. The mean values for Exclusions are negative in 22 years out of 23. It
also evident that mean values of Exclusions has become more negative over time. For example,
the average exclusion from 1993–1997 is –0.005, whereas the average for 2012–2016 is –0.023.
15 Many papers use the age of 60 years as a threshold.
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This finding is consistent with analysts’ exclusion of income-decreasing items, a trend that
increases during our sample period. Untabulated statistics reveal that GAAP and street EPS differ
by at least one (ten) cent(s) for 85.6 (56.5) percent of the sample. At least a one-dollar difference
can be found for 24.3 percent of the sample. In sum, the magnitude of street exclusions is
substantial relative to GAAP earnings, especially during financial-turmoil periods.
[Insert Table 2 here]
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses for three sub-
samples of firm-years: forced turnovers, voluntary turnovers, and no turnovers. T-tests and
Wilcoxon signed rank tests (both two-tailed) are performed by comparing whether performance
measures of forced turnover sub-sample are significantly different from performance measures of
voluntary and no turnover sub-samples. Table 3 shows that observations with forced CEO turnover
are associated with poorer performance in the year before forced turnover than in other two groups.
Specifically, in the forced turnover subsample, mean and median values of EPS_GAAP,
EPS_Street, Ret_Idio, Ret_Peer, MTB, and SGR are significantly lower than those in the control
sample. The mean (median) Exclusions is –0.034 (–0.003) for forced turnovers, compared to –
0.022 (0.000) for voluntary turnovers and –0.016 (0.000) for the no turnover sample. In other
words, firms that dismiss their CEOs have significantly more negative street exclusions than firms
whose CEOs leave voluntarily or firms that do not change CEOs. Firm governance variables
(CEO_Age, CEO_Owner, and CEO_Dual) are also significantly different between the sub-
samples. On average, the CEOs in the forced turnover sub-sample are younger, hold less equity
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and have lower CEO-chairman duality rates compared voluntary turnovers. In sum, turnover firm-
years differ from non-turnover firm-years along several performance dimensions; they are
associated with lower GAAP earnings, lower stock returns, greater returns volatility, lower growth
expectations, younger CEOs and stronger CEO power (as measured by CEO-chairman duality).
[Insert Table 3 here]
Table 4 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlations between the variables. For brevity,
we discuss the Pearson correlations. EPS_GAAP and EPS_Street have a correlation coefficient of
0.593. Exclusions are positively correlated with EPS_GAAP (0.468), implying that higher GAAP
earnings are associated with less negative exclusions. Exclusions are negatively correlated with
EPS_Street (–0.364). Exclusions are positively correlated with For_Rev, Ret_Idio and Ret_Peer.
Although the correlations are modest, they suggest that analysts exclude more expenses when
market performance is poor. Unsurprisingly, better-performing firms receive higher valuations, as
indicated by the positive correlation between LogMVE and accounting (EPS_GAAP and SGR) and
stock market performance variables (Ret_Idio and Ret_Peer). Negative correlation between
Std_Ret and LogMVE indicate that riskier companies have lower valuations. Finally, CEO_Age
and CEO_Dual have small positive correlations with the two earnings measures.
[Insert Table 4 here]
5. Empirical results
5.1. Street exclusions and CEO turnover
Table 5 presents the results of our multinomial logistic analysis of the relation between
CEO turnover and our variables of interest. We examine three models. In Model (1), GAAP
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earnings are the main variable of interest. We find that the probability of forced CEO turnover, but
not voluntary turnover, is negatively related to GAAP earnings, as indicated by the negative and
highly significant coefficient for EPS_GAAP in Model (1). Therefore, these results indicate that
GAAP earnings play an important role in a board’s decision to dismiss its CEO.
In Model (2), street earnings replace GAAP earnings as the main variable of interest. The
results for Model (2) in Table 5 show that EPS_Street also has a significant negative relation to
forced CEO turnover in the subsequent year. An untabulated Vuong (1987) test shows that Model
(1) is significantly better in explaining forced turnovers than Model (2). In Model (3), we include
both street earnings and street exclusions—the sum of which is GAAP earnings. Both are
negatively related to the incidence of forced turnover, which is consistent with the results of Model
(1), as both components add up to GAAP earnings. Model (3) thus confirms that both street
exclusions and street earnings are similarly associated with turnover.
For forced CEO ousters, an inspection of the control variables suggests that firms with
greater return volatility are more likely to change the CEO. The (untabulated) odds-ratio is highest
for Std_Ret, followed by EPS_GAAP and Ret_Idio. Size, growth opportunities and leverage, as
measured by LogMVE, SGR, MTB and LEV, play no role in forced turnovers. Consistent with
Bhagat and Bolton (2008), forced turnover is less likely if the CEO holds a greater equity stake.
Finally, CEO_Dual, a measure of CEO power, is not significantly associated with turnovers. The
lack of significance may be explained by Brickley et al. (1997), who argue that it is not
theoretically obvious which leadership structure is best. Finally, the coefficient on CEO age is
negative in the forced sub-sample but positive in the voluntary sub-sample. This result is consistent
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with the findings of Engel et al. (2003). This indicates that older CEOs tend to resign, whereas
boards regard age as a positive personal trait (because it is likely correlated with experience), so
they do not tend to dismiss older executives.
[Insert Table 5 here]
We next assess the effect of our variables of interest on the duration of CEO employment
using time-to-event analysis, as outlined in equation 3. We employ the Cox proportional hazard
model. Note that a positive coefficient implies a larger hazard rate or a shorter “survival” rate.
Structured in a similar way to Table 5, Table 6 reports the results of this analysis. Model (1)
confirms that higher GAAP earnings are associated with longer service periods. The coefficient
for street earnings on a standalone basis is insignificant in Model (2), implying this external
measure of performance, on its own, is unrelated to forced turnovers. The results in Model (3)
again suggest that boards use both street earnings and exclusions in CEO turnover decisions
because both are significantly negative at the 1% level. The control variables also largely feature
similar relations to those reported in Table 5.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Taken together, Tables 5 and 6 provide evidence that pertains to our first hypothesis.
Specifically, we reject H1 as we find that GAAP earnings and street exclusions are associated with
CEO turnover. In particular, street exclusions of expenses are associated with a higher probability
of forced CEO turnover and shorter service periods.
5.2. Regulatory changes
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In this section, we provide evidence pertaining to our second hypothesis. Recall that the
2003 Regulation G likely focused analyst attention on non-recurring items. Against this
background, Panel A of Figure 1 does not provide compelling evidence that the gap between
GAAP earnings and street earnings has progressively decreased since Regulation G was
introduced. Next, we repeat the analysis conducted in Table 5 to examine whether our results differ
by time period. If street exclusions become less valuation relevant after Regulation G, we expect
to find that their association with forced turnover is weaker than that before 2003. Therefore, we
re-run Model (3) in Table 4, but we now allow the coefficients of interest to vary between the pre-
and post-Regulation G periods (i.e., 1993–3/2003 vs. 4/2003–2016).
Panel A of Table 7 provides the results for two different time periods. The results show
that Exclusions continue to be significantly and negatively related to forced turnover in both Pre-
Regulation G and Post-Regulation G periods, albeit with lower magnitude and significance in the
post-Regulation G period. As a result, we reject Hypothesis 2 that street exclusions are unrelated
to forced CEO turnover decisions in different sub-periods. The coefficient on EPS_Street is
marginally significant in the pre-Regulation G period but highly significant in the post-Regulation
period. Because GAAP earnings are the sum of street earnings and street exclusions, this evidence
suggests that GAAP earnings play an important role in both periods (also confirmed by untabulated
tests).
[Insert Table 7 here]
We further analyze the post-Regulation G period, distinguishing between 4/2003-2009 and
the C&DI period of 2010-2016. We report in Panel B of Table 7 that both (neither), street earnings
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nor exclusions are related (unrelated) to forced CEO turnovers in the first (second) period.16 One
possible explanation for this surprising finding is related to the deterioration in the usefulness of
GAAP reporting for both investors and executives that has accelerated in recent years (Bushman
et al., 2016; Lev, 2018). This trend may explain both why managers resort more frequently to non-
GAAP in recent years (Ford, 2016) and the increased enforcement of non-GAAP. Our finding
could be therefore picking up this recent “breakdown” in financial reporting, which in turn, may
have caused boards to increasingly rely on non-earnings measures (GAAP or otherwise). An
interesting question for future research is whether this phenomenon is a temporary in nature or a
more permanent development.
An inspection of the control variables indicates that—for Ret_Idio and CEO_Age—the
effect is the same in all periods. However, for a few control variables, the sign or significance level
changes. For example, Std_Ret, becomes insignificant after 2003, whereas CEO_Owner becomes
negative and significant after 2003.
5.3. Determinants of street exclusions and their association with CEO turnover
The analyses above indicate that street exclusions are used in CEO retention decisions,
with the exception of the most recent period. In this part of our investigation, we seek to provide
evidence on the determinants of analysts’ exclusions. Recall that street earnings tend to exclude
income-decreasing items from GAAP earnings (as Table 3 indicates), which implies that certain
expense types are associated with street exclusions. However, I/B/E/S does not provide a precise
16 This finding also holds for CEO bonus payouts. Specifically, untabulated analysis shows that street earnings and
street exclusions are significantly positive in pre- and post-Regulation G periods but not in the C&DI period.
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formula as to what analysts exclude for each firm-year. Instead, we follow a statistical approach
as outlined in equation 4 whereby exclusions are regressed on a number of expense line items in
the income statement.
Panel A of Table 8 reports the descriptive statistics for these line items. All variables are
deflated by the beginning-of-period market value of equity. The largest expense item is COGS
(with mean value of -1.038), followed by SGA and Depr (mean values are -0.258 and -0.059,
respectively). The smallest expenses are SI, Other, and TAX. Although small in magnitude, special
items represent accounting charges that are not expected to reoccur and are related to losses
recognized in the current period with respect to past investments. The implication, therefore, is
that they are indicative of managerial investment skill and talent. Panel B reports the results of the
estimation of equation 4 by Fama-French 48 industry groups to control for normal exclusions in
each industry. The findings indicate that the exclusions strongly relate to SI and, to a much lesser
extent to Other. The mean (median) coefficient estimate of 0.968 (0.885) indicate that an almost
one-to-one mapping exists between exclusions and special items. The model explains on average
about 40.7% of the variation in Exclusions. While this result indicates a good explanatory power
for the model, it also suggests that the source of exclusions relates to other factors, so exclusions
are not identical across firm-years.
Panel C of Table 8 reexamines the relation between CEO turnover and street exclusions in
two ways. First, we explore whether the turnover event is more sensitive to unusual (or abnormal)
exclusions because boards may view abnormally high exclusions more cautiously (i.e., as less
informative). We estimate abnormal exclusions using the residual obtained from the regression
reported in Panel B. Therefore, normal exclusions are estimated using the regression line. Model
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(1) of Panel C reports the results of this procedure. Both Normal_Exclusions and
Abnormal_Exclusions, are negatively related to forced CEO turnover. Second, since exclusions
are closely associated with special items, the likelihood of CEO turnover may be higher when
exclusions are special items. We test this assertion in Model (2), reported in Panel C. Specifically,
we divide exclusions into two components: special items (SI) and other exclusions (Other
Exclusions). The results indicate that both SI and other exclusions are negatively related to CEO
turnover. This result, combined with the previous analyses, indicates that boards do not shield
CEOs from the consequences of reporting large special items when making dismissal decisions.
[Insert Table 8 here]
5.4. Bonus compensation and street exclusions
Our finding that street exclusions are associated with forced turnover events is consistent
with the notion that boards regard street exclusions as an internal performance measure, even if
market participants may not use it for valuation purposes. Boards also use performance measures
to set executive compensation schemes and reward good performance. Therefore, we examine
whether street exclusions are associated with cash bonuses. It is reasonable to expect that CEOs’
bonuses are based on the same earnings measures that boards use when replacing CEOs, because
bonuses are designed to set targets for a CEO and a CEO will eventually be replaced if these targets
are not met. Therefore, we regress the logarithm of one plus the cash bonus on the same
independent variables as those used in the previous models, but the independent are not lagged.17
17 Our assumption is that variables affecting the retention decision also affect annual bonus schemes. Therefore we
use the same independent variables as in the turnover model.
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We investigate the relation between bonus and EPS_Street and Exclusions by estimating the
following Tobit regression from our data:
ܮ݋݃(1 + ܤ݋݊ݑݏ) = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁ + ߚଶܨ݋ݎ_ܴ݁ݒ + ߚଷܴ݁ݐ_ܫ݀݅݋+ߚସܴ݁ݐ_ܲ݁݁ݎ + ߚହܵݐ݀_ܴ݁ݐ + ߚ଺ܮ݋݃ܯܸܧ + ߚ଻ܯܶܤ + ߚ଼ܵܩܴ+ߚଽܮ݁ݒ + ߚଵ଴ܥܧܱ_ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁ + ߚଵଵܥܧܱ_ܣ݃݁ + ߚଵଶܥܧܱ_ܱݓ݊݁ݎ+ߚଵଷܥܧܱ_ܦݑ݈ܽ + ݕ݁ܽݎ ݂݂݁݁ܿݐݏ
(5)
The results of estimating the Tobit and OLS models are reported in Table 9. We find results
similar in nature to those reported for CEO turnover in Model (3) in Table 5. In the Tobit model
both EPS_Street and Exclusions are significantly and positively related to the bonuses paid to
CEOs in the current year. Because the coefficient for Exclusions is positive and exclusions are, on
average, income decreasing, the implication is that the greater the magnitude of expense exclusions,
the lower the current year’s bonus. The tenor of the results is unchanged when we estimate an OLS
regression that includes CEO-firm fixed effects. The coefficient on EPS_Street is 0.543 while the
coefficient on Exclusions is 0.741. An (untabulated) F-test fails to reject the hypothesis that the
coefficients are equal (p-value = 0.369). We also repeat this analysis for the three sub-periods in
the spirit of Table 7. Untabulated results confirm that the above relations between street EPS and
street exclusions hold in the first two sub-periods, but not in the C&DI period. Therefore, we
conclude from these analyses that boards also do not ignore street exclusions when designing
bonus schemes for CEOs with the exception of the most recent period.18
[Insert Table 9 here]
18 This result is in contrast to Gaver and Gaver (1998). Their sample consists of 376 firms between 1970 and 1996 and
they estimate firm-specific regressions which may explain differences in findings.
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5.5. Additional robustness tests
We conduct several additional tests to verify the robustness of our results to alternative
specifications and control for potential omitted variables. For brevity, we do not tabulate the
sensitivity tests but they are available upon request.
First, we examine a potential non-linear relation between street exclusions and turnover.
This analysis is motivated by the view that small to moderate exclusions may be ignored or
overlooked by boards. Specifically, we categorize Exclusions into quintiles and create indicator
variables to represent each quintile. We then re-estimate our multinomial Model (3) of Table 5
using these indicator variables. As expected, forced turnover sensitivity is significant in two most
negative exclusions group. Moreover, the sensitivity of turnover to exclusions monotonically
declines in the quintile rank. These findings suggest that large negative exclusions lead boards to
discipline CEOs faster. We also delete positive exclusions and re-estimate the model using a
sample of only negative exclusions; the tenor of the results is similar.
CEOs compensation schemes may also influence CEO turnover decisions. We examine
whether the relation between street exclusions and turnover is different between firms that
emphasize relatively more short-term vs. long-term incentives. We compute a ratio of the sum of
salary and bonus to total compensation for each CEO-firm observations. A larger (smaller) value
of this ratio indicates that a CEO’s compensation scheme is designed to provide more short-term
(long-term) incentives. We divide the sample into two groups based on the median value of this
ratio. The coefficients on EPS_Street and Exclusions remain negative for the long-term incentives
sub-sample while only the coefficient on Exclusions is negative in the short-term incentives sub-
sample (untabulated). A possible explanation for this finding is that “myopic” boards are likely to
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stress more current poor performance (captured in Exclusions) than persistent earnings (captured
in EPS_Street).
We noted earlier that the dot.com crisis in the early 2000s and the great financial crisis of
2007-2008 may be exceptional years. Our first robustness test therefore is to exclude 2001, 2007
and 2008 from the sample and rerun our tests. After excluding these years, we find our results
remain qualitatively unchanged.
One concern regarding our findings is that street exclusions may be influenced by
manipulative and opportunistic communications from managers. If boards are aware of this
possibility, they would have a strong reason to use GAAP earnings. If the manipulation of analysts’
perceptions of street earnings is more common among managers who manipulate reported numbers,
we need to verify that our results are not driven by these manipulative firms and managers. To do
so, we add an indicator of adverse restatements, a proxy for manipulations, from the
AuditAnalytics database to the models explored in Table 5. The results remain the same as we find
that our results are similar for manipulating and non-manipulating firms.
It is possible that both poor GAAP earnings and the need to dismiss a CEO are driven by
an omitted correlated variable. One plausible candidate for this underlying force is the strength of
board monitoring. Weak monitoring can lead to both poor performance and eventually the need to
oust the CEO. We therefore also examine whether the effect of exclusions on forced CEO turnover
is affected by governance quality. Using the G-index data of Gombers et al. (2003), we add two
indicator variables to our main multinomial model.19 Untabulated results reveal that both low and
19  We download governance index data from Andrew Metrick’s webpage
(http://faculty.som.yale.edu/andrewmetrick/data.html). This data is available for years 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002,
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high G-index indicators are insignificant to predict turnovers. Importantly, even with this limited
sample Exclusions continues to be robust in explaining the likelihood of forced turnovers.
Another possible omitted variable is managerial talent. This is supported by the view that
ability drives both performance and boards’ assessment of the fit of the CEO with the firm. We
therefore re-estimate our models after explicitly controlling for the effect of managerial ability.20
Untabulated results show that voluntary turnovers are marginally more likely for CEOs having a
higher ability, but insignificant in predicting forced CEO turnovers. Thus, street exclusions contain
information not captured by managerial ability scores. We also introduce into the model several
other control variables, but our results remain similar.21
Our variables are deflated by the lagged share price. To the extent that markets anticipated
price turnovers, this deflation may affect our inferences. Share prices tend to decrease prior to
turnover and subsequently increase (see, for example, Huson et al., 2004). Hence, our deflated
performance measures are likely larger for turnover firm-years and lower for other firm-years.
While this works against finding a negative relation between the performance measures in question
and subsequent CEO dismissal, we use an alternative deflator. Specifically, we use the average
total assets per share and find that the results reported in Table 5 are qualitatively the same.
2004, and 2006. Larger G-index is associated with lower governance quality. Following Hazarika et al. (2012), our
G-index indicator variables are defined as follows: LOW_G-INDEX (HIGH_G-INDEX) takes a value of one if G-
index is below 6 (above 12), otherwise zero.
20  We download managerial ability scores from Peter Demerjian’s webpage
(http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html) and included the variable MA_SCORE_2016 in our multinomial
model. See, Demerjian et al. (2012) for details.
21 These additional variables are: i) meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts indicator variable (MEET); ii) indicator
variable for street earnings losses (LOSS), because Ghosh and Wang (2018) show that losses are an important
determinant of CEO turnovers, iii) and performance-adjusted absolute discretionary accruals (absDACC), because
Hazarika et al. (2012) show that earnings management increase the likelihood of forced CEO turnover.
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We have followed prior literature in the classification of turnovers between forced and
voluntary. We therefore conduct a placebo test to rule out the possibility that our findings are
driven by the misidentification of relevant turnover events. In previous analyses we excluded CEO
turnovers due to death (140 observations). As a placebo test, we include these cases and estimate
a multinomial model in which the dependent variable identifies whether there was turnover (as
originally defined), turnover due to death, or no CEO turnover in a given firm year. The results
show that CEO’s age is significantly positively associated with the probability of CEO’s death.
Importantly, our accounting performance measures do not predict CEO turnovers due to death.
In our analyses, we control for numerous firm and CEO characteristics. However,
unobservable firm characteristics may still drive our results. Hence, to ensure that our results are
not driven by correlated omitted variables, we re-estimate our models after controlling for firm
fixed effects using two different approaches. First, we estimate a linear probability model using
OLS and include firm fixed effects in our models. Second, we estimate a conditional logistic
regression with firm fixed effects. Unlike the OLS fixed effects model, conditional logistic
regression use only information from those firms that ousted their CEO at least once during the
sample period. Results from both approaches are similar to our main results (untabulated).
Specifically, that forced CEO turnovers, but not voluntary turnovers, are significantly related to
street exclusions and street earnings. We therefore conclude that our results are not driven by some
unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics.
6. Summary
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Financial analysts often compute a measure of earnings, namely street earnings, that differs
from reported earnings and use it in assessing a firm’s performance and valuation. Street earnings
typically exclude non-recurring expenses and losses from reported GAAP earnings. We investigate
whether street exclusions that analysts disregard are also disregarded in boards’ CEO retention
decisions. If boards place great importance on the market’s view of firm performance, street
exclusions should be unrelated to retention decisions. However, we find that the likelihood and
speed of CEO turnover are significantly related to street exclusions. Importantly, this result holds
for forced turnovers but not for voluntary turnovers confirming the idea that exclusions are used
by boards (although in combination of other elements of GAAP earnings). The result also holds
before and after Regulation G (years 1993–3/2010), but not in the C&DI period (4/2010–2016).
Finally, in a similar vein, we show that street exclusions affect CEO bonus payouts. These findings
suggest that in communicating with analysts, managers trade-off a higher exposure to board
scrutiny of failure against maintaining a high stock price, which benefits their equity holdings. Our
findings also suggest that managers who delay the reporting of write-offs also reduce the dismissal
risk. However, this may increase the odds of punitive enforcement action by the SEC and
shareholders (Hazarika et al., 2012).
As a final note, the lack of findings for the post-C&DI period is intriguing. We encourage
future research to study whether the role of GAAP earnings in CEO retention decisions have
permanently disappeared.
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Appendix
Variable name Measurement and source of data
Dependent variables
CEO_TO Indicator variable: Chief executive officer (CEO) turnover is
identified based on whether the same individual holds the CEO title
during the current and subsequent year, taking a value of 1 if the CEO
has changed and 0 otherwise.
logTenure Log of the number of years that the CEO is in office (i.e., the CEO’s
survival time).
log(1+Bonus) Log of one plus the CEO’s cash bonus.
Main variables
EPS_GAAP Earnings per share (EPS), excluding extraordinary items from
Compustat, scaled by the lagged stock price from Compustat.
EPS_Street EPS reported by I/B/E/S scaled by the lagged stock price from
Compustat.
Exclusions EPS_GAAP–EPS_Street
Control variables
For_Rev Analyst forecast revision: Mean consensus EPS estimate from the last
month of the fiscal year reported by I/B/E/S minus the same estimate
made nine months earlier scaled by the lagged stock price from
Compustat.
Ret_Idio Idiosyncratic return: The residual value from the annual cross-
sectional (using the two-digit SIC code classification) regressions that
use an intercept to predict the firm’s annual returns (calculated from
the CRSP monthly return files).
Ret_Peer Industry return: The fitted value from the annual cross-sectional
(using the two-digit SIC code classification) regressions that use an
intercept to predict the firm’s annual returns (calculated from the
CRSP monthly return files).
Std_Ret Standard deviation of the firm’s stock return over the 12 months
ending at the fiscal year-end.
MTB The market-to-book ratio is the sum of total liabilities plus the market
value of equity deflated by the firm’s total assets.
LogMVE The natural logarithm of the market value of equity.
SGR Sales growth is defined as change in sales divided by beginning of
period sales.
LEV The book leverage ratio is defined as long-term debt plus the current
portion of long-term debt deflated by total assets.
CEO_Age CEO’s age measured in years.
CEO_Ownership CEO’s shareholding in the firm.
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Appendix (continued)
Variable name Measurement and source of data
CEO_Dual Indicator variable: 1 if the CEO is also the chairman and 0
otherwise.
COGS Cost of goods sold divided by the beginning-of-period market value
of equity.
SGA Selling, general and administrative expenses divided by the
beginning-of-period market value of equity.
Depr Depreciation and amortization divided by the beginning-of-period
market value of equity.
Tax Income taxes divided by the beginning-of-period market value of
equity.
SI Special items divided by the beginning-of-period market value of
equity.
Other The difference between expenses (sales minus income before
extraordinary items) and other income statement components
(COGS, SGA, Depr, Tax, and SI).
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Figure 1
GAAP earnings versus street earnings
Figure 1A: Mean values over time
Figure 1B: Standard deviation over time
Figure 1A (1B) Plots the mean (standard deviation) values of EPS_GAAP, EPS_Street, and Exclusions from 1993 to
2016. EPS_GAAP is earnings per share, including extraordinary items from Compustat, scaled by the lagged stock
price from Compustat. EPS_Street is earnings per share from I/B/E/S scaled by the lagged stock price from Compustat.
Exclusions are EPS_GAAP minus EPS_Street.
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Table 1
Frequencies of CEO turnovers.
Year
Number of
observations
Number of
turnovers
Forced turnovers Forced as a % of
total turnovers
1993 667 71 13 18.3 %
1994 918 93 17 18.3 %
1995 955 85 35 41.2 %
1996 992 84 27 32.1 %
1997 1,021 89 26 29.2 %
1998 1,073 110 21 19.1 %
1999 1,088 115 31 27.0 %
2000 1,081 95 31 32.6 %
2001 1,043 87 18 20.7 %
2002 1,075 97 31 32.0 %
2003 1,106 91 21 23.1 %
2004 1,126 132 32 24.2 %
2005 1,080 102 32 31.4 %
2006 1,051 93 27 29.0 %
2007 1,182 133 46 34.6 %
2008 1,322 108 29 26.9 %
2009 1,323 85 26 30.6 %
2010 1,305 140 40 28.6 %
2011 1,262 120 45 37.5 %
2012 1,237 131 28 21.4 %
2013 1,211 144 32 22.2 %
2014 1,199 171 46 26.9 %
2015 1,146 129 30 23.3 %
2016 1,108 130 32 24.6 %
Total 26,571 2,635 716 27.2 %
This table reports the total number of firm-year observations and cases of CEO turnover and forced CEO turnovers
from 1993–2016. The data exclude the CEO’s first year in office, CEO turnover unrelated to the board’s decision to
dismiss the CEO (death, poor health, interim appointments, mergers, spinoffs, and retirements because of old age),
and firms in the financial and utility sectors (SIC codes between 6000–6999 and 4900–4999).
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Table 2
GAAP earnings vs. street earnings: mean values and standard deviations.
Year
EPS_GAAP
Mean
EPS_GAAP
Std.
EPS_Street
Mean
EPS_Street
Std.
Exclusions
Mean
Exclusions
Std.
1993 0.019 0.111 0.027 0.104 -0.012 0.122
1994 0.040 0.073 0.032 0.087 0.005 0.093
1995 0.039 0.091 0.038 0.103 -0.001 0.101
1996 0.036 0.091 0.037 0.092 -0.005 0.103
1997 0.036 0.080 0.042 0.090 -0.010 0.110
1998 0.024 0.086 0.035 0.095 -0.013 0.105
1999 0.035 0.099 0.037 0.111 -0.003 0.113
2000 0.035 0.120 0.040 0.122 -0.007 0.125
2001 0.001 0.135 0.021 0.126 -0.023 0.136
2002 -0.012 0.146 0.023 0.129 -0.037 0.149
2003 0.015 0.144 0.029 0.140 -0.015 0.134
2004 0.033 0.102 0.035 0.120 -0.005 0.108
2005 0.034 0.100 0.040 0.122 -0.008 0.114
2006 0.036 0.093 0.044 0.124 -0.011 0.116
2007 0.031 0.102 0.039 0.122 -0.009 0.110
2008 -0.026 0.181 0.023 0.146 -0.051 0.165
2009 0.004 0.184 0.041 0.167 -0.037 0.153
2010 0.047 0.106 0.059 0.115 -0.012 0.111
2011 0.037 0.117 0.052 0.115 -0.015 0.108
2012 0.027 0.140 0.052 0.122 -0.024 0.118
2013 0.033 0.119 0.051 0.110 -0.016 0.100
2014 0.026 0.100 0.042 0.096 -0.017 0.092
2015 0.005 0.134 0.035 0.102 -0.030 0.111
2016 0.007 0.146 0.034 0.118 -0.028 0.110
Total 0.023 0.123 0.038 0.119 -0.017 0.120
This table shows the mean and standard deviation values for GAAP_EPS, Street_EPS, and Exclusions from 1993 to
2015. The data exclude the CEO’s first year in office, CEO turnover unrelated to the board’s decision to dismiss the
CEO (death, poor health, interim appointments, mergers, spinoffs, and retirements because of old age), and firms in
the financial and utility sectors (SIC codes between 6000–6999 and 4900–4999). EPS_GAAP is earnings per share,
including extraordinary items from Compustat, scaled by the lagged stock price from Compustat. EPS_Street is
earnings per share from I/B/E/S scaled by the lagged stock price from Compustat. Exclusions are EPS_GAAP minus
EPS_Street.
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Table 3
Summary statistics and univariate comparisons.
Forced turnovers (N=716) Voluntary turnovers (N=1,919) No turnovers (N=23,937)
Mean Median Std. Mean Median Std. Mean Median Std.
EPS_GAAP –0.022 0.029 0.169 0.019a 0.046a 0.123 0.025a 0.047a 0.122
EPS_Street 0.006 0.038 0.172 0.040a 0.046a 0.122 0.039a 0.044a 0.116
Exclusions –0.034 –0.003 0.158 –0.022c 0.000a 0.128 –0.016a 0.000a 0.117
For_Rev –0.023 –0.004 0.080 –0.017c –0.002b 0.066 –0.010a 0.000a 0.059
Ret_Idio –0.161 –0.182 0.442 –0.059a –0.089a 0.392 –0.008a –0.044a 0.443
Ret_Peer 0.188 0.160 0.283 0.169 0.161 0.269 0.183 0.167 0.290
Std_Ret 0.132 0.114 0.073 0.107a 0.094a 0.060 0.115a 0.098a 0.064
LogMVE 7.157 7.120 1.624 7.644a 7.518a 1.681 7.434a 7.272a 1.626
MTB 2.043 1.555 1.401 1.939c 1.561 1.212 2.082 1.653a 1.346
SGR 0.120 0.054 0.309 0.086a 0.062 0.217 0.120 0.080a 0.260
LEV 0.222 0.188 0.203 0.233 0.221a 0.176 0.220 0.205 0.183
CEO_Age 50.418 51.000 4.927 61.524a 61.000a 5.817 55.476a 55.000a 7.311
CEO_Owner 0.781 0.000 2.233 0.983c 0.000c 2.860 1.220a 0.000 3.443
CEO_Dual 0.465 0.000 0.499 0.698a 1.000a 0.459 0.584a 1.000a 0.493
This table reports the means, medians, and standard deviations for selected variables by three CEO turnover groups from 1993 to 2016: i) The forced CEO turnover
sample consists of 716 firm-years; ii) The voluntary CEO turnover consists of 1,919 firm-years; and iii) No turnovers sample consists of 23,937 firm-years. The data
exclude the CEO’s first year in office, CEO turnover unrelated to the board’s decision to dismiss the CEO (death, poor health, interim appointments, mergers, spinoffs,
and retirements because of old age), and firms in the financial and utility sectors (SIC codes between 6000–6999 and 4900–4999). EPS_GAAP is GAAP earnings per
share scaled by the lagged price. EPS_Street is street earnings per share scaled by the lagged price. Exclusions are items included in GAAP earnings but excluded from
street earnings. For_Rev is the analysts’ forecast revisions during the fiscal year. Ret_Idio is the idiosyncratic return. Ret_Peer is the industry return. Std_Ret is return
volatility. LogMVE is the logarithm of the market value of equity. MTB is the market-to-book ratio. SGR is sales growth. LEV is leverage. CEO_Age is the CEO’s age.
CEO_Owner is the CEO’s percentage of total shares owned. CEO_Dual is the CEO-chairman duality indicator. Full variable definitions are provided in the Appendix.
The mean and median differences between the forced turnover vs. voluntary turnover and forced turnover and no turnover samples are tested using a t-test and Wilcoxon
z-test, respectively. The superscripts a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test.
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Table 4
Correlations.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
(1) EPS_GAAP  .642 .495 .406 .278 .120 –.275 .180 .026 .129 .005 .091 .013 .071
(2) EPS_Street .593  –.172 .327 .190 .071 –.207 .163 –.101 .026 .088 .077 .143 .023
(3) Exclusions .468 –.364  .193 .154 .073 –.122 .055 .188 .182 –.108 .033 –.135 .064
(4) For_Rev .433 .399 .092  .403 .144 –.109 .209 .289 .342 –.095 –.023 .044 –.006
(5) Ret_Idio .173 .129 .070 .233  –.103 –.093 .170 .286 .176 –.039 .002 .019 –.002
(6) Ret_Peer .077 .040 .048 .072 –.061  –.028 .077 .183 .057 –.066 –.008 –.025 .024
(7) Std_Ret –.356 –.249 –.118 –.165 .034 .049  –.435 –.136 .033 –.071 –.147 –.035 –.092
(8) LogMVE .252 .202 .067 .193 .116 .078 –.390  .343 .066 .117 .097 –.031 .138
(9) MTB .071 –.037 .112 .123 .286 .170 .032 .261  .293 –.297 –.071 –.031 –.019
(10) SGR .157 .082 .077 .195 .165 .069 .074 .041 .274  –.093 –.077 –.107 –.001
(11) LEV –.143 –.040 –.118 –.092 –.047 –.067 –.005 .066 –.224 –.050  .065 –.060 .081
(12) CEO_Age .054 .051 .002 .001 –.018 –.014 –.146 .090 –.098 –.091 .051  .076 .265
(13) CEO_Owner –.007 –.005 –.005 .007 .008 –.042 .004 –.097 .000 –.029 –.093 .120  –.080
(14) CEO_Dual .054 .042 .012 –.004 –.014 .023 –.080 .143 –.021 –.010 .057 .263 .079
This table reports Pearson correlations below the diagonal and Spearman correlations above the diagonal. Correlations for which the absolute value is greater than 0.014 are
significant at the 0.01 level. All variables are as defined in Table 3 and the Appendix
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Table 5
Multinomial logistic regression relating forced and voluntary CEO turnover to performance measures.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Variable Forced Voluntary Forced Voluntary Forced Voluntary
EPS_GAAP –1.108 (0.000) –0.363 (0.133)
EPS_Street –0.679 (0.034) 0.061 (0.792) –1.164 (0.001) –0.089 (0.745)
Exclusions –1.019 (0.001) –0.239 (0.313)
For_Rev –0.511 (0.378) –1.216 (0.005) –0.653 (0.282) –1.484 (0.000) –0.383 (0.525) –1.360 (0.002)
Ret_Idio –0.705 (0.000) –0.254 (0.000) –0.730 (0.000) –0.266 (0.000) –0.706 (0.000) –0.261 (0.000)
Ret_Peer 0.190 (0.350) –0.123 (0.361) 0.172 (0.397) –0.132 (0.328) 0.194 (0.341) –0.127 (0.344)
Std_Ret 2.616 (0.000) 1.203 (0.031) 3.060 (0.000) 1.455 (0.007) 2.585 (0.000) 1.350 (0.015)
LogMVE 0.037 (0.223) 0.083 (0.000) 0.029 (0.333) 0.079 (0.000) 0.039 (0.202) 0.080 (0.000)
MTB –0.039 (0.282) –0.028 (0.262) –0.040 (0.265) –0.025 (0.329) –0.040 (0.273) –0.025 (0.320)
SGR –0.080 (0.606) –0.275 (0.024) –0.125 (0.419) –0.299 (0.014) –0.083 (0.592) –0.290 (0.017)
LEV 0.127 (0.572) 0.104 (0.497) 0.244 (0.269) 0.138 (0.365) 0.127 (0.571) 0.118 (0.442)
CEO_Age –0.096 (0.000) 0.121 (0.000) –0.097 (0.000) 0.121 (0.000) –0.096 (0.000) 0.121 (0.000)
CEO_Owner –0.067 (0.001) –0.090 (0.000) –0.068 (0.000) –0.090 (0.000) –0.067 (0.001) –0.090 (0.000)
CEO_Dual –0.050 (0.551) 0.051 (0.382) –0.047 (0.574) 0.051 (0.382) –0.048 (0.571) 0.051 (0.383)
Year indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 10.82% 10.77% 10.83%
Number of firm-years 26,571 26,571 26,571
Estimates from multinomial logistic regressions that examine the likelihood of forced and voluntary CEO turnover, based on our sample of 716 forced cases of CEO turnover
(F_CEO_TO) and 1,919 voluntary cases of CEO turnover (V_CEO_TO) from 1993–2016. The sample data on CEO turnover come from the ExecuComp database. Turnover
is classified as forced based on the classification scheme proposed by Parrino (1997). The data exclude the CEO’s first year in office and firms in the financial and utility
sectors (SIC codes between 6000–6999 and 4900–4999). All independent variables are measured in the year before the year of the turnover. A positive (negative) coefficient
indicates that an increase in the covariate increases (decreases) the probability of CEO turnover. Year and industry indicators are included but not reported. All variables are
as defined in Table 3 and the Appendix.
47
Table 6
Cox proportional hazard model relating forced CEO turnover to performance measures.
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
EPS_GAAP –0.943 (0.000)
EPS_Street 0.082 (0.663) –0.517 (0.010)
Exclusions –1.092 (0.000)
For_Rev –1.144 (0.000) –1.973 (0.000) –1.409 (0.000)
Ret_Idio –0.146 (0.001) –0.175 (0.000) –0.152 (0.000)
Ret_Peer 0.077 (0.417) 0.059 (0.536) 0.068 (0.474)
Std_Ret 1.133 (0.001) 1.767 (0.000) 1.308 (0.000)
LogMVE 0.076 (0.000) 0.068 (0.000) 0.075 (0.000)
MTB –0.063 (0.000) –0.056 (0.001) –0.057 (0.000)
SGR –0.254 (0.001) –0.304 (0.000) –0.268 (0.000)
LEV 0.392 (0.000) 0.471 (0.000) 0.381 (0.000)
CEO_Age –0.143 (0.000) –0.139 (0.000) –0.139 (0.000)
CEO_Owner –0.127 (0.000) –0.128 (0.000) –0.128 (0.000)
CEO_Dual –0.235 (0.000) –0.232 (0.000) –0.228 (0.000)
Year indicators Yes Yes Yes
Industry indicators Yes Yes Yes
Number of events 3,008 3,008 3,008
Number of censored
data 23,563 23,563 23,563
The dependent variable is the number of years that the CEO is in office (logTenure). A positive (negative) Cox
proportional hazards model coefficient indicates a shorter (longer) expected time as CEO. The sample consists of
26,571 firm-year observations, 716 of which are forced CEO turnovers (3,008 event firm-years), from 1993 to 2016.
Data are right censored for CEOs in office at December 31, 2016, who have not yet left their position. Also voluntary
turnovers are censored. The data exclude the CEO’s first year in office, CEO turnover unrelated to the board’s decision
to dismiss the CEO (death, poor health, interim appointments, mergers, spinoffs, and retirements because of old age),
and firms in the financial and utility sectors (SIC codes between 6000–6999 and 4900–4999). Year and industry
indicators are included but not reported. Industries are classified using the Fama-French 48-industry classification. p-
values appear in parentheses. All variables are as defined in Table 3 and the Appendix.
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Table 7
How regulation changes affected CEO turnover-performance sensitivity?
Panel A: Pre-Regulation G period (1993-3/2003) vs. post-regulation G period (4/2003-2016)
Pre-Regulation G period Post-Regulation G period
Variable Forced Voluntary Forced Voluntary
EPS_Street –0.979 (0.097) –0.114 (0.827) –1.229 (0.003) 0.091 (0.782)
Exclusions –1.377 (0.005) –0.141 (0.748) –0.734 (0.056) –0.209 (0.464)
For_Rev –1.314 (0.175) –1.520 (0.046) 0.421 (0.580) –1.397 (0.011)
Ret_Idio –0.621 (0.000) –0.300 (0.006) –0.789 (0.000) –0.252 (0.006)
Ret_Peer 0.447 (0.106) –0.070 (0.709) 0.004 (0.990) –0.163 (0.424)
Std_Ret 3.917 (0.001) 0.833 (0.352) 2.063 (0.051) 1.950 (0.008)
LogMVE 0.123 (0.021) 0.127 (0.000) –0.006 (0.878) 0.060 (0.013)
MTB –0.084 (0.153) 0.013 (0.745) –0.018 (0.696) –0.046 (0.160)
SGR 0.099 (0.628) –0.182 (0.321) –0.295 (0.218) –0.377 (0.023)
LEV 0.578 (0.134) 0.559 (0.047) –0.021 (0.942) –0.112 (0.552)
CEO_Age –0.074 (0.000) 0.124 (0.000) –0.115 (0.000) 0.121 (0.000)
CEO_Owner –0.294 (0.308) –0.028 (0.640) –0.069 (0.000) –0.097 (0.000)
CEO_Dual –0.078 (0.582) –0.001 (0.991) –0.005 (0.965) 0.097 (0.160)
Year indicators Yes Yes
Industry indicators Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 12.22% 11.00%
Cases of turnover 250 679 466 1,240
Firm-years 10,038 16,533
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Panel B: Further analysis of the post-regulation G period
Post-Regulation G period
(04/2003 – 2009)
C&DI period
(2010 – 2016)
Variable Forced Voluntary Forced Voluntary
EPS_Street –2.282 (0.000) 0.328 (0.500) –0.338 (0.577) –0.063 (0.891)
Exclusions –0.975 (0.076) –0.336 (0.402) –0.499 (0.374) –0.022 (0.957)
For_Rev 1.315 (0.223) –1.408 (0.078) –0.126 (0.914) –1.717 (0.027)
Ret_Idio –0.720 (0.000) –0.229 (0.072) –0.936 (0.000) –0.261 (0.047)
Ret_Peer 0.055 (0.897) –0.127 (0.648) 0.298 (0.564) –0.144 (0.650)
Std_Ret 1.747 (0.239) 1.143 (0.283) 2.176 (0.162) 2.751 (0.009)
LogMVE 0.006 (0.916) 0.047 (0.203) –0.027 (0.600) 0.074 (0.022)
MTB 0.024 (0.737) 0.037 (0.442) –0.030 (0.637) –0.109 (0.017)
SGR –0.385 (0.271) –0.157 (0.521) –0.231 (0.488) –0.578 (0.012)
LEV –0.213 (0.632) –0.017 (0.953) 0.150 (0.684) –0.168 (0.497)
CEO_Age –0.095 (0.000) 0.123 (0.000) –0.134 (0.000) 0.120 (0.000)
CEO_Owner –0.049 (0.079) –0.091 (0.000) –0.088 (0.002) –0.099 (0.000)
CEO_Dual 0.068 (0.664) 0.214 (0.049) –0.086 (0.568) 0.016 (0.857)
Year indicators Yes Yes
Industry indicators Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 11.45% 11.90%
Cases of turnover 213 528 253 712
Firm-years 8,065 8,468
Estimates from multinomial logistic regressions that examine the likelihood of forced and voluntary CEO turnover, based on our sample of 716 forced cases of CEO
turnover (F_CEO_TO) and 1,919 voluntary cases of CEO turnover (V_CEO_TO) from 1993–2016. In Panel A, the sample is divided into pre- and post-Regulation G
periods, with April 2003 as the cutoff point. In Panel B, the post-Regulation G period is further divided based on the issuance of Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations
(C&DI) by the SEC. The sample data on CEO turnover come from the ExecuComp database. Turnover is classified as forced based on the classification scheme proposed
by Parrino (1997). The data exclude the CEO’s first year in office and firms in the financial and utility sectors (SIC codes between 6000–6999 and 4900–4999). All
independent variables are measured in the year before the year of the turnover. A positive (negative) coefficient indicates that an increase in the covariate increases
(decreases) the probability of CEO turnover. Year and industry indicators are included but not reported. All variables are as defined in Table 3 and the Appendix.
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Table 8
What income statement components drive the difference between GAAP and street earnings?
Panel A: Descriptive statistics (N=26,571)
Variable Mean Std. P25 Median P75
COGS –1.038 –1.038 –1.038 –1.038 –1.038
SGA –0.258 –0.258 –0.258 –0.258 –0.258
Depr –0.059 –0.059 –0.059 –0.059 –0.059
Tax –0.023 –0.023 –0.023 –0.023 –0.023
SI –0.019 –0.019 –0.019 –0.019 –0.019
Other –0.021 –0.021 –0.021 –0.021 –0.021
Panel B: Summary statistics of the cross-sectional estimates
Estimate Mean t-value p-value Median Std.
Intercept –0.002 –0.25 (0.807) 0.005 0.050
COGS 0.002 0.22 (0.825) –0.008 0.054
SGA –0.063 –1.07 (0.289) –0.005 0.382
Depr –0.201 –1.05 (0.300) –0.024 1.253
Tax 0.115 1.46 (0.151) 0.197 0.517
SI 0.968 18.04 (0.000) 0.885 0.352
Other 0.208 4.00 (0.000) 0.200 0.342
Adj. R2 0.407 11.47 (0.000) 0.362 0.233
Panel C: Forced CEO turnovers and normal and abnormal exclusions
Model (1) Model (2)
EPS_Street -1.018 (0.005) –1.002 (0.006)
Normal_Exclusions -1.447 (0.004)
Abnormal_Exclusions -0.722 (0.061)
SI –1.500 (0.003)
Other Exclusions –0.734 (0.045)
Other control variables Yes Yes
Year indicators Yes Yes
Industry indicators Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 10.26% 10.27%
Cases of turnover 716 716
Firm-years 24,652 24,652
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of expense components. We disaggregate total expenses following the
approach used in Donelson et al. (2011). COGS is the cost of goods sold; SGA is selling, general, and administrative
expenses; Depr is depreciation expenses, Tax is tax expenses; SI is special items; and Other is other expenses. All
variables are scaled by market value of equity. Panel B reports the summary statistics of the estimated coefficients
and the adjusted R-square of 43 industry regressions from 1993–2016. Year and industry indicators are included but
not reported. Industries are classified using the Fama-French 48-industry classification. The estimated model is as
follows:
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Panel C reports the estimates from logistic regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnover, based on
our sample of 716 forced cases of CEO turnover (F_CEO_TO) from 1993–2016. Voluntary turnovers are excluded
from the sample. Independent variables are the same as in Tables 5–7 except that in Column (1), Exclusions are
replaced by the fitted value from the above regression (labeled as ‘normal’ exclusions) and the regression residual
(labeled as ‘abnormal’ exclusions) values from the model above. In Column (2), Exclusions are divided into special
items (SI) and other exclusions (Exclusions–SI). p-values appear in parentheses.
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Table 9
Are street exclusions related to CEOs cash bonus?
Variable Tobit Model OLS Model
EPS_Street 1.438 (0.000) 0.543 (0.006)
Exclusions 1.545 (0.000) 0.741 (0.000)
For_Rev 4.759 (0.000) 2.044 (0.000)
Ret_Idio 0.807 (0.000) 0.342 (0.000)
Ret_Peer 0.423 (0.001) 0.327 (0.000)
Std_Ret -1.328 (0.017) -0.368 (0.246)
LogMVE 0.362 (0.000) 0.336 (0.000)
MTB -0.156 (0.000) 0.003 (0.873)
SGR 0.556 (0.000) 0.574 (0.000)
LEV -0.227 (0.170) -0.743 (0.000)
CEO_Age 0.003 (0.497) -0.248 (0.000)
CEO_Owner 0.118 (0.000) 0.022 (0.005)
CEO_Dual 0.003 (0.954) -0.230 (0.000)
Year indicators Yes Yes
Industry indicators Yes No
CEO-Firm indicators No Yes
Firm-years 26,571 26,571
The dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus CEO’s annual bonus (logBonus). The sample consists of 26,571
firm-year observations from 1993 to 2016. The sample data on CEO bonus come from the ExecuComp database. The
data exclude the CEO’s first year in office, CEO turnover unrelated to the board’s decision to dismiss the CEO (death,
poor health, interim appointments, mergers, spinoffs, and retirements because of old age), and firms in the financial
and utility sectors (SIC codes between 6000–6999 and 4900–4999). Year and industry indicators are included but not
reported. Industries are classified using the Fama-French 48-industry classification. p-values appear in parentheses.
OLS Model standard errors are heteroskedasticity adjusted. All variables are as defined in Table 3 and the Appendix.
